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I. INTRODUCTION
When Andrea Yates drowned her five children, she believed
she was preventing Satan from infiltrating their souls.1 Rusty Yates
blamed both the mental health system and the criminal justice system
for his wife's actions and also for her initial conviction. 2 Andrea Yates
suffered from post-partum depression and psychosis; had attempted
suicide twice; had been hospitalized on several occasions for
psychiatric treatment; and was found not guilty by reason of insanity
in her 2006 retrial.' Although Yates likely will spend the rest of her
life in a mental institution, she will receive mental health treatment
throughout her time at the facility. 4 Yates would have spent her life in
prison without access to comparable mental health treatment if her
original conviction had been upheld. 5 Yates escaped this fate through
her subsequent insanity verdict, but many individuals who suffer from
mental health problems and who are convicted of crimes and
incarcerated in the United States are not so fortunate.
6
Reaching a result contrary to Yates's insanity verdict, the
Supreme Court upheld the first-degree murder conviction of Eric
Clark in 2006.7 Clark shot and killed a police officer because he
1. Lisa Sweetingham, Andrea Yates Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity in Children's
Deaths, COURTTV.coM, July 26, 2006, http://www.courttv.com/trials/yates/
072606_verdict2_ctv.html.
2. Timothy Roche, Andrea Yates: More to the Story, TIME, Mar. 18, 2002,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,218445-3,00.html.
3. Sweetingham, supra note 1. Yates's original conviction was overturned on appeal, in
part because the false testimony of an expert medical witness could have wrongfully influenced
the jury and in part because the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for
rehearing. Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
4. See generally Yates Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, CNN.COM, July 26, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006LAW/07/26/yates.verdict/index.html?iref=newssearch (noting that
Yates will go to a state mental facility until she is deemed no longer to be a threat). Yates's
former husband said the verdict was "really about Andrea's quality of life .... Is she going to
spend her time in a prison cell ... or is she going to spend time in a hospital and get good
medical treatment ... ?" Id.
5. See Elaine Cassel, The Andrea Yates Verdict and Sentence: Did the Jury Do the Right
Thing?, Mar. 18, 2002, FINDLAw, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/cassel/20020318.html (discussing
Yates's original conviction and noting that few mentally ill inmates "receive appropriate
diagnoses or treatment. The treatment they do receive consists mostly of medications. There is
little, if any, cognitive-behavioral therapy, the kind that would help prisoners actually effect
change in their lives.").
6. See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1, 9 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf
(discussing the large number of individuals with mental illness who do not receive any treatment
while incarcerated).
7. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 746-47 (2006).
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believed that aliens impersonating government agents were taking
over Flagstaff, Arizona, and bullets were the only way to stop these
aliens.8 The trial court found him guilty of first-degree murder, and he
will serve a life sentence in prison even though the trial judge noted
that Clark "was indisputably afflicted with paranoid schizophrenia at
the time of the shooting."9 The Court held that states may choose how
to define insanity because "due process imposes no single canonical
formulation of legal insanity."'10 Affording this interpretive freedom to
the states is necessary, according to the Court, because mixing "legal
concepts of mental illness" and "medical concepts of mental
abnormality" creates a great deal of disagreement among medical
professionals.1 The Court also held that preventing a defendant from
relying on mental illness to negate the specific intent of the crime was
not a due process violation.' 2
Both Andrea Yates and Eric Clark committed terrible acts
while suffering from severe mental illness. The disparate outcomes of
these two cases serve as one indicator of the way in which the current
criminal justice system fails people who suffer from mental disorders
in the United States. Other indicators come from available data about
the prevalence of mental illness within U.S. prisons and jails. One
study estimated that roughly fifteen percent of inmates 13 in the
United States in 2004 suffered from severe mental disorders such as
schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder, bipolar disorder, and major
depression.14 These numbers do not include inmates suffering from
any other mental health disorders or undiagnosed mental health
problems. The U.S. Department of Justice found that "[a]t midyear
2005 more than half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health
problem."' 5 However, of the large number of inmates with mental
health problems and disorders, only seventeen percent of local jail
inmates, twenty-four percent of federal prisoners, and thirty-four
8. Id. at 745.
9. Id. at 746.
10. Id. at 753.
11. Id. at 752.
12. Id. at 779.
13. This Note will use the term "inmate" or "incarcerated person" rather than "offender" or
"convict" to refer to the individuals discussed. While "inmate" can refer to individuals who are
incarcerated pre-trial and have not yet been convicted of any crime as well as individuals who
have been convicted and are serving sentences, the discussion regarding theories of punishment
will necessarily refer to those individuals who have been convicted of a crime and are therefore
serving a sentence of some kind.
14. H. Richard Lamb et al., Treatment Prospects for Persons with Severe Mental Illness in
an Urban County Jail, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 782, 783 (2007).
15. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 1 (emphasis added).
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percent of state prisoners received any mental health treatment after
admission. 16 These combined statistics paint a grim picture of the
pervasiveness of mental health problems in the criminal justice
system and the failures of that system to address such problems.
This Note argues that the policies and practices of the U.S.
criminal justice system fail to achieve any articulated purpose of
punishment when they provide inadequate mental health resources to
incarcerated persons suffering from mental disorders. This Note
ultimately demonstrates that, despite some drawbacks, emphasizing a
rehabilitative approach that uses insights from the juvenile justice
system is the best way to serve all people with mental disorders in the
adult criminal justice system. In Part II, the Note defines central
concepts such as mental disorders and also discusses the common
federal and state justifications for criminal sanctions: retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and/or rehabilitation. Part II includes a
historical survey of the juvenile justice system, which is a potential
model for addressing the government's systemic failure to achieve its
stated goals. Part III argues that the current justice system is failing
to meet its stated goals because retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation are inappropriate purposes for punishing individuals
with mental disorders, and that poor treatment in the current system
renders any rehabilitation efforts inadequate. Part IV analyzes the
benefits and drawbacks of using the juvenile justice system as a model
for the rehabilitation and treatment of people with mental disorders in
the criminal justice system. It examines the history of the juvenile
justice movement and its principle tenets, and will suggest that the
juvenile justice model for rehabilitation can provide useful guidance.
II. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE MODEL
A. Definitions and Terminology
Before delving into the complex issue of mental health
treatment in the criminal justice system, it is important to identify the
terms used in this discussion. "Mental illness" and "mental disorder"
can hold a wide variety of meanings, in large part because, "like many
other concepts in medicine and science, [the concepts] lack[] a
16. Id. at 9.
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consistent operational definition that covers all situations."'17 Despite
this difficulty, some baseline definitions are possible. The most recent
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
("DSM-JV-TR") defines "mental disorder" as a syndrome or pattern of
behavior that causes some type of actual distress (like pain) or in some
other way interferes with a person's ability to function.' 8 The DSM-IV-
TR goes on to define specific mental disorders, such as mood disorders,
anxiety disorders, psychotic disorders, and personality disorders. 19
The definition of mental illness in common legal contexts is
more convoluted. For example, civil commitment statutes universally
require proof of a mental illness or disorder before a state may
involuntarily commit one of its citizens. 20 Many of these statutes
define the term vaguely or intertwine the definition of mental illness
with other commitment criteria. 21 Statutory definitions of mental
illness are widely varied across jurisdictions, usually apply only in
specific legal contexts, and generally are useless as a comprehensive
definition of "mental illness."22 Because this Note focuses on mental
health treatment (in the context of the criminal justice system and
correctional facilities), the American Psychiatric Association definition
of mental disorders as presented in the DSM-IV-TR-which is
intended as a manual to guide treatment-is more instructive than
the inconsistent and circular statutory definitions created by state
17. AM. PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
at xxx (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
18. Id. at xxx-xxxi. DSM-IV-TR defines mental illness as:
[A] clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs
in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom)
or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of
freedom. In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and
culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved
one... [and] must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral,
psychological, or biological dysfunction in the individual.
Id. at xxxi.
The DSM-IV-TR uses relevant criteria and objective indicia to classify mental disorders into
identifiable groups, but this classification approach has some limitations. Id. The same mental
disorder can produce quite varied symptoms, and clear dividing lines between identifiable
disorders do not exist. Id. As such, the DSM-IV-TR often provides a checklist of symptoms, but
specifies that only a set number (for example, five of nine) of these symptoms need be present in
order to diagnose an individual with a specified illness. Id. at xxxi-xxxii.
19. See, e.g., id. at 429-85 (describing the particular criteria for anxiety disorders).
20. Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,
1202 (1974).
21. Id.
22. See id. (citing a variety of state statutory definitions, including definitions of mental




legislatures. Although the DSM-IV-TR cautions against employing its
definition in forensic settings,23 this Note does not attempt to define
mental illness as a legal construct, but rather employs a psychological
definition within a legal context.
For two primary reasons, this Note focuses specifically on
individuals in correctional facilities who suffer from mental disorders 24
that have been or could be diagnosed under the DSM-IV-TR. First,
much of the existing empirical research on mental disorders in the
criminal justice system is limited to conditions recognized in the DSM-
IV-TR (and often to only a few specific diagnoses). 25 It would,
therefore, be inadvisable to draw conclusions about other types of
mental conditions not included in this research. Second, the criminal
justice system is currently failing to meet the needs of all individuals
with mental health issues, including those individuals with clearly
identified and widely accepted clinical diagnoses. Even though
inmates without diagnosed DSM-IV-TR disorders nevertheless may
have problems in their lives that cause some degree of mental
anguish, these difficulties cannot be identified or categorized easily. If
the criminal justice system attempts to address the needs of
individuals who do not fit into a DSM-IV-TR category without first
creating a comprehensive approach to meet the more clearly
identifiable needs of those who do, the justice system likely will be
unable to create a comprehensive, cohesive system of addressing the
needs of inmates with mental disorders.
Finally, this Note attempts to evaluate the current criminal
justice system from the perspective of individuals who have a "severe"
mental disorder according to a 2004 study, which only includes
schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder, bipolar disorder, and major
depression.26 Each of these illnesses is diagnosed under Axis I of the
23. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 17, at xxxvii.
24. This Note will not use terminology such as "the mentally ill," "the mentally disordered,"
or "a schizophrenic." Instead, it will refer to "people with mental disorders" or "a person with
schizophrenia," as recommended by the DSM-IV-TR, which takes note of the "common
misconception that a classification of mental disorders classifies people, when actually what are
being classified are disorders that people have." Id. at xxxi. Since other scholars and advocates
use the terms "mental illness," "mental disability," or "mental health problems" interchangeably,
these terms may also appear in the discussion and, like "mental disorder," should be understood
to encompass the general DSM-IV-TR definition and all included disorders. If research or
analysis relates to a more specific definition or disorder, the narrower definition will be
indicated.
25. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 1 (using the DSM-IV-TR criteria to define the term
"mental health problems" and basing statistical conclusions on this definition).
26. Lamb et al., supra note 14, at 783.
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DSM-IV-TR. 27  Schizophrenia and schizo-affective disorder are
psychotic disorders, 28 while bipolar disorder and major depression are
mood disorders. 29 Only about one percent of the U.S. population
suffers from a type of schizophrenic disorder; only 1.6 percent of the
U.S. population suffers from bipolar disorder; and only 5.3 percent of
the U.S. population suffers from major depression. 30 However,
approximately fifteen percent of the current prison and jail population
suffers from one of these severe mental disorders, 31 while many more
inmates suffer from other mental disorders not included in these
categories. 32 Limiting the discussion to individuals with severe mental
illnesses provides a base from which the theories of punishment may
be examined. 3
3
B. Problems with the Theories Behind the Current Criminal Justice
System
Criminal codes often include purpose clauses to communicate
the driving theories behind sentencing decisions within the state or
federal criminal justice system.34 These guidelines generally reflect
one or more of the four commonly cited goals of criminal punishment:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Professor
Christopher Slobogin has recategorized these commonly cited
purposes of punishment into three basic models: 1) the punishment
model, which predominately deals with retribution and "just deserts";
2) the prevention model, which incorporates deterrence and
incapacitation principles; and 3) the protection model, which embodies
more rehabilitative concepts. 35
27. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 17, at 27-28. Axis I consists of clinical disorders (meaning all
disorders addressed by the psychological classification system except for personality disorders
and mental retardation) and "Other Conditions that May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention." Id.
28. IRWIN G. SARASON & BARBARA R. SARASON, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE PROBLEM OF
MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR 350 (10th ed. 2002).
29. Id. at 304.
30. Id. at 332, 350; WrongDiagnosis.com, Prevalence and Incidence of Depression,
http://www.wrongdiagnosis.com/d/depression/prevalence.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
31. Lamb et al., supra note 14, at 783.
32. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 1.
33. These arguments may also be applicable to individuals with other DSM-IV-TR
diagnoses, as well as individuals who have mental health problems that meet no diagnostic
criteria under the DSM. However, including such a broad range of mental health disorders in the
discussion would make the present argument unwieldy.
34. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) (enumerating the purposes for criminalization);
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 (2008) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-102(3) (2008) (same).
35. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 6-14 (2006).
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According to Professor Slobogin, today's criminal justice system
looks most like the punishment model, which "focuses solely on
sanctioning past acts" and "aims to exact retribution."36 Although the
U.S. Code notes that a sufficient criminal sentence complies with all of
the major punishment purposes (retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation), 37 the current criminal justice
system continues to place a heavy emphasis on retribution.38
Retribution differs from the other three purposes because it is not
utilitarian in nature, but rather is used to sanction criminals for
wrongdoing even when the punishment will produce no social
benefit.39 In contrast, sentences based on utilitarian purposes are
more likely to reflect the social goals of rehabilitation or deterrence, as
they often incorporate needed treatment plans and may vary in length
depending on the need for incapacitation and the probability of
deterrence. 40 Retributive sentences, however, focus only on the
immorality of the criminal act and the severity of the "moral penalty"
the individual deserves to suffer. 41 Despite the obvious tensions
between these purposes, statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)
sometimes list all four purposes, effectively creating a statute that
purports to serve all four purposes at the same time.42 In practice, the
conflict between the listed purposes means that judicial sentencing
decisions cannot encompass all four of the goals equally, and certain
purposes necessarily will be preferred over others.43
Scholars will continue debating the applicability and suitability
of these four purposes of punishment for generations to come.
However, these debates take place in a theoretical world far removed
from the current criminal justice system, a system in which
approximately half of those incarcerated have some type of mental
health problem. 44 In short, it does not matter whether scholars prefer
36. Id. at 8-9.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
38. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2000)
(referencing the "unorthodox measures" courts and legislatures have used to subvert utilitarian
purposes and reinstate retribution as the primary purpose of the criminal justice system).
39. Id. at 1315-16.
40. Id. at 1318.
41. Id. at 1317.
42. Id.
43. See Cotton, supra note 38, at 1317 (identifying the conflict between a rehabilitative
sentence, which focuses on ways in which the inmate might be helped, and a retributive
sentence, which attempts to harm the inmate in return for the harm the inmate caused).
44. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 3 (identifying the prevalence of symptoms of
mental disorders in jails (60.5%), federal prisons (39.8%), and state prisons (49.2%), while noting
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one punishment purpose over another: for the reasons set forth in Part
III, the current criminal justice system fails to serve any of them.
C. The Development of the Juvenile Justice System
To improve this system, it is useful to examine the rationale for
treating children differently from adults and to determine if the same
rationale might apply to individuals with mental disorders. If the
rationale is comparable, the juvenile justice system can provide a
model for an adult criminal justice system that adequately addresses
the needs of inmates with mental illness.
The juvenile justice system differs in many ways from the adult
criminal justice system, a distinction first and most clearly identified
around the turn of the twentieth century.45 Judge Mack noted that
prior to the passage of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, criminal
law did not distinguish between children and adults in terms of
criminal responsibility.46 Judge Mack observed that these viewpoints
were beginning to change as some jurisdictions examined how the
criminal justice system might be more beneficial to juvenile inmates
and how juvenile and adult inmates might be separated from one
another within the system. 47 Judge Mack then presented a vision for
the new juvenile justice system, a system using the parens patriae
power 48 of the courts and focusing on rehabilitating and reforming
young inmates.49 This vision included compassionate judges who do
not focus on the child's guilt but instead ask: "[H]ow has he become
what he is, and what had best be done in his interest?" 50 This vision
also included cottages in the country with fresh air and good
educational opportunities instead of large prison-like structures with
that only 11% of the general United States population met the same criteria for symptoms of
mental disorders under the DSM).
45. See, e.g., Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 132 et seq. (creating a justice system
for juvenile inmates separate from the adult system and emphasizing rehabilitation and non-
adversarial proceedings).
46. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1909).
47. See id. (noting that many of the attempts in the last fifty years to provide training and
reform to juvenile inmates failed because states were making no effort to understand "the needs
of the boy").
48. Parens patriae is Latin for "parent of his or her country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1144 (8th ed. 2004). Under this doctrine, the State has the power to intervene like a parent in
the best interest of the child when biological parents are not fulfilling their duties. BARRY C.
FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 3 (2d ed. 2004).
49. Mack, supra note 46, at 109.
50. Id. at 119.
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bars and locks, 51 and most of all, a strong resolve to prevent a child
from engaging in criminal activity at all.52
The landmark Supreme Court decision of In re Gault noted
that juvenile courts traditionally provided none of the constitutional
protections available in adult criminal courts. 53 This lack of protection
was justified by the parens patriae power because children arguably
do not have the same right to liberty that adults do, as they are
always in "custody."54 Despite these arguments, the Gault Court
determined that the Due Process Clause requires that juveniles
receive some of the same constitutional protections as adults in
proceedings that could result in detention. 55 Using the Gault rubric in
subsequent cases, the Court determined the constitutional protections
that should extend to juveniles on a case-by-case basis. 56 It found, for
example, that under the Due Process Clause, juveniles have a right to
have their delinquency proven beyond a reasonable doubt 57 but do not
have a right to a jury trial. 58
In the decades after Gault, the juvenile justice system has
continued to shift from the purely rehabilitative vision of Judge Mack
to a system focused more on punishment and prevention of juvenile
crime.5 9 According to Professor Barry Feld,60 the debate over the
structure and purpose of the juvenile court is animated by several
binary conceptualizations of the juvenile and adult justice systems.
61
Professor Feld identifies five relevant binary pairs: dependency versus
responsibility, treatment versus punishment, informality versus
formality, welfare versus just deserts, and discretion versus rule of
law.62 The juvenile justice system originally embraced the former half
51. Id. at 114.
52. Id. at 122.
53. 387 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1967).
54. Id. at 17.
55. Id. at 33-34 (providing right to adequate notice), 41 (providing right to counsel in
situations that implicate a juvenile's liberty interests), 55 (extending the privilege against self-
incrimination to juveniles).
56. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (clarifying the test for extending new
constitutional protections to juveniles: whether the right "is among the 'essentials of due process
and fair treatment' required during the adjudicatory stage"). The "adjudicatory stage" is defined
as the stage at which a delinquency determination is made and that determination could result
in commitment to a state institution. Id.
57. Id. at 368.
58. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
59. FELD, supra note 48, at 30-31.
60. Feld is a law professor and author of the casebook CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 48.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 31.
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of these binary pairs-believing that children were dependent and
needed treatment-and structured the system to operate informally,
focusing on the child's welfare and making discretionary decisions.
63
By contrast, today's juvenile justice system focuses on the latter half of
the binary pairs-viewing children as responsible individuals who
need punishment-and makes decisions in a formal way while
focusing on just deserts and the rule of law.
64
The reforms have called the future and the purpose of the
juvenile justice system into question. It is currently unclear how much
(if any) of the rehabilitative system that Judge Mack once envisioned
for the juvenile system remains today. According to Professor Feld,
"[b]eginning in the mid-1980s, politicians manipulated and exploited
public frustration with crime [and] fear of increases in youth
violence.., and adopted laws and policies to 'get tough.' "65
Nevertheless, the theoretical history and current practical
applications may yet be instructive. Specifically, juvenile justice's
concept of pretrial diversion can be seen in the mental health courts
that are growing in popularity in the adult criminal system. Mental
health courts, discussed more fully in Part IV, are special courts
created exclusively to serve individuals who suffer from mental health
problems and are charged with crimes. These specialty courts may
provide an effective means of dealing with individuals suffering from
mental illness in the criminal justice system, but without them, the
adult criminal system fails to meet any of its proposed purposes of
punishment.
III. HOW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILS TO MEET ANY
ARTICULATED PURPOSE OF PUNISHMENT
The four justifications or goals articulated for criminal
sanctions are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. However, the current justice system fails to meet any of
these articulated goals when people with severe mental illness are
involved. Section A demonstrates that retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation are ineffective and inappropriate when applied to
individuals with mental disorders, and the poor quality of mental
health treatment currently available in today's jails and prisons
makes any rehabilitation efforts inadequate. Therefore, a different
model is needed. In order to address this failure, Section B analyzes
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 483.
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the benefits and drawbacks of using juvenile justice as a model for the
rehabilitation and treatment of people with mental disorders in the
criminal justice system.
A. The Problem with Retribution
Retribution is problematic when it is used to justify punishing
individuals with mental disorders. The basic concept of retribution, as
noted earlier, is that "a just society is morally obligated to punish the
blameworthy and, conversely, may not condone punishment of the
blameless."6 6 This idea is premised on a "free will postulate," which
assumes that individuals can choose their conduct freely and, thus,
that they deserve punishment when they make poor or immoral
choices.67 Thus, if an individual did not voluntarily choose to engage in
criminal conduct, that individual is not morally culpable and does not
merit punishment.6
8
Statutory schemes already acknowledge this possibility
through the availability of the insanity defense. 69 For example, under
the Model Penal Code, the test for escaping culpability reads as
follows: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law. '70 It is a misconception to think that the
insanity defense will protect individuals with mental disorders from
unjust punishment under the scheme of retribution. As Clark v.
Arizona demonstrated, even individuals like Eric Clark (who believed
that the person he shot and killed was an alien impersonating a police
officer) who have significant mental illness may not escape retributive
sanctions if they are unable to meet the stringent demands of the
insanity defense.7 1 Therefore, according to Professor Slobogin:
[I]f the concern is that people with mental illness should not be sent to prison or
languish there without help for their suffering, the proper response is better
rehabilitative programs for all those who need treatment .... [Tihis rationale for the
insanity defense wrongly suggests that those who are 'sane' do not deserve treatment.
7 2
66. SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 9.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 9-10.
69. E.g., Cassel, supra note 5 (recognizing that "[a]ll but two states have laws creating an
insanity defense").
70. SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 30-31 (quoting Model Penal Code § 4.01(1)).
71. See 548 U.S. 735, 746-47 (2006) (reviewing the verdict of the trial court).
72. SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 60.
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The insanity defense currently suffers from a multitude of
other problems as well.73 For example, one goal of the defense is "to
help us decide whom [sic] among those who commit criminal acts
deserve [sic] to be the subject of criminal punishment," but the defense
as it exists today "does not adequately carry out this definitional
task."74 In effect, the insanity defense is an attempt to sort individuals
into two specific and inflexible categories (i.e. "culpable" or "not
culpable") based on their cognitive and functional limitations, even
though mental health problems are so varied that the DSM-IV-TR
uses five different axes to diagnose the same individuals' cognitive and
functional limitations. 75
The insanity defense attempts to distinguish the individuals
who are not culpable and need treatment from the individuals who are
culpable and deserve punishment. The Clark Court suggested that no
singular standard for insanity could be determined-precisely because
the complex interaction of legal constructs and medical concepts
creates "such fodder for reasonable debate."76 Given the complexity of
mental health disorders, it is not surprising that many individuals
suffering from severe mental disorders do not escape conviction and
sentencing by virtue of the insanity defense. For Andrea Yates, two
different juries came to vastly different conclusions about her
culpability in her initial trial and her retrial, even though they were
presented with substantially similar evidence regarding her mental
health symptoms. 77 Yates's experience demonstrates the possibility
that one jury might find an individual sane and culpable and a
different jury, presented with the same evidence, might find the same
individual to be insane and not culpable. Andrea Yates and Eric Clark
both suffered from severe mental disorders that significantly
influenced their behavior and their thought processes.78 Arguably,
both Yates and Clark lacked understanding of the wrongfulness of
73. See id. at 23-24 (discussing the defense's chaotic and incoherent history, its many
permutations, and its overbreadth, which lead to a serious inability to identify those who deserve
punishment).
74. Id. at 24.
75. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 17, at 27.
76. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752-53 (2006) (holding that "due process imposes no
single canonical formulation of legal insanity," and therefore, the definition of legal insanity is
largely a state choice).
77. Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215, 218-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The State's mental
health expert testified that an episode of a popular crime drama depicted a woman with
postpartum depression drowning her children and escaping punishment under the insanity
defense, although no such episode ever aired. Id.
78. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 745 (describing Eric Clark's battle with mental illness); Yates,
171 S.W.3d at 216-19 (describing Andrea Yates's mental disorder).
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their actions, yet Clark was convicted of murder while Yates was
found not guilty by reason of insanity. Such variable outcomes suggest
that relying on the insanity defense to separate culpable individuals
from those who should not be subject to retribution is wholly
inadequate.
Additionally, those individuals suffering from mental disorders
who do not escape conviction vis-A-vis the insanity defense may be
punished more severely than similarly situated individuals without a
mental disorder. This disproportionate result undermines the idea of
"just deserts," an important principle to the retributive scheme. 79 As
previously discussed, most inmates with mental health problems do
not receive mental health treatment while they are incarcerated s
°
Thus, they suffer the full range of their mental health symptoms while
incarcerated. One might argue that most inmates with mental health
problems probably were not receiving adequate mental health
treatment prior to incarceration and therefore are not suffering any
additional symptoms during their confinement.81 However, the high
rates of co-morbidity with mental disorders and alcohol or other
substance abuse82 suggest that many individuals who are not
receiving treatment in the community manage their short-term
symptoms by abusing alcohol or narcotics.8 3 When these individuals
are incarcerated and do not have access to their usual "medication" or
to comprehensive mental health treatment, they experience the full
impact of their symptoms. As a result, an inmate with mental illness
not only receives the punishment of incarceration (like all individuals
who commit the same crime), but also the further punishment of her
unchecked and potentially severe mental health symptoms-a
punishment that incarcerated individuals without mental illness do
not receive.
Some research suggests that individuals with mental disorders
serve longer sentences than individuals without mental disorders.
First, state prisoners with mental disorders on average receive
sentences five months longer than individuals without mental
disorders.8 4 In addition, state prisoners with mental disorders often
79. See Cotton, supra note 38, at 1315 (using the phrase "just deserts" as an alternate
expression of the retributive principle that crime necessitates punishment).
80. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 9.
81. See id. (noting that comparable percentages of individuals received treatment in the
year prior to incarceration as those who received treatment while incarcerated).
82. Id. at 6.
83. See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 17, at 191-295 (defining substance-related
disorders).
84. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 8.
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serve on average four months longer than those without mental
disorders.8 5 Second, inmates with mental health problems usually
have served more prior sentences than inmates without mental health
problems.8 6 While this research suggests a correlation between mental
health problems and harshness of punishment, no data actually
suggest a causation element.
Not only are inmates with severe mental disorders receiving
the same or greater punishment than inmates who do not suffer from
mental health problems, these inmates are not as morally
blameworthy for their actions because of their mental illness. For
example, someone suffering from schizophrenia often experiences
hallucinations while in a conscious state.8 7 Auditory hallucinations,
the most common type of hallucination associated with schizophrenia,
often cause individuals to believe that voices are speaking to them,
ordering them to act in a certain way, or accusing them of certain
actions.88 Individuals with schizophrenia often also have delusions: "a
faulty interpretation of reality that cannot be shaken despite clear
evidence to the contrary."8 9 The delusional features of schizophrenia
can explain Eric Clark's beliefs and actions. 90 Approximately fifteen
percent of individuals who suffer from major depressive disorder have
some psychotic features, which are often delusional in nature. 91
Andrea Yates's beliefs are prime examples of such delusions.
92
Although individuals like Clark and Yates may engage in behaviors
that result in horrifying crimes, it is difficult to argue that an
individual driven to such behavior by the delusional beliefs and
hallucinations caused by severe mental illness is as culpable as an
individual who engages in the same behaviors after logical and
reasoned reflection. However, with the exception of the few
individuals who escape through the insanity defense, the current
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 8.
87. SARASON & SARASON, supra note 28, at 356.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 355. Delusions can take many forms, including bizarre delusions (such as a belief
that someone else is inserting or removing thoughts from an individual's mind), referential
delusions (belief that certain gestures, songs, words, etc., are specifically intended to speak to the
individual), and persecutory delusions. Id. Delusions can appear either logical or illogical, and
they may also cause violent behavior. Id.
90. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 745 (2006) (describing a psychiatrist's testimony of
Clark's delusions about aliens at the time of the shooting).
91. SARASON & SARASON, supra note 28, at 312. These delusional psychotic features often
cause the individual to develop false beliefs about reality, typically including ideas about guilt
and punishment. Id.
92. See Roche, supra note 2, at 1 (describing Andrea Yates's beliefs that it was her fault
that her children were going to hell and that Satan would only leave her if she were executed).
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criminal justice system promotes retributive punishments for
individuals with mental disorders, even though the culpability of these
individuals necessarily is diminished.
B. The Problem with Deterrence
Justifying the punishment of individuals suffering from mental
disorders through deterrence principles also presents problems.
Deterrence assumes not only that people act of their own free will (just
as retribution does), but also that people "are reasonably rational and
respond to their perception of the costs and benefits attached to
alternative courses of action."93 Therefore, punishments for crimes
need only be severe enough to make the costs of punishment outweigh
the benefits of committing the crime. 94 Deterrence has a cognitive
component; thus, the theory posits that an individual's subjective
perception of the certainty and severity of punishment will have a
deterrent effect on her decision to violate the law. 95 General
deterrence occurs when others view the punishment an individual
receives and subsequently decide not to engage in similar behaviors.
Specific deterrence occurs when the individual decides not to engage
in the behavior again after receiving punishment.
The theory driving the deterrence rationale breaks down when
it is applied to a population with mental disorders. Both general and
specific deterrence rely on a basic cost-benefit analysis: the costs of
punishment versus the benefits of the crime. However, individuals
with certain mental disorders have a distorted, subjective perception
of the costs and benefits of their actions, 96 and mental health
treatment-rather than legal sanctions-is the only way to change
that perception. Not only might people with mental illnesses be unable
to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, but even if they are able to make
a rational decision, they subsequently may be unable to correlate their
behavior with their prior decision. 97 For example, individuals with
93. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 118 (rev. 2d ed. 1983).
94. RONALD L. AKERS, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES: INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION 16-18
(2d ed. 1996).
95. Id. at 19.
96. For example, "[n]europsychological deficits are a consistent finding in groups of
individuals with Schizophrenia. Deficits are evident across a range of cognitive abilities,
including memory, psychomotor abilities, attention, and difficulty in changing response set."
DSM-TR-IV, supra note 17, at 305. One of the features of a manic episode associated with bipolar
disorder is "poor judgment [which] often lead[s] to an imprudent involvement in pleasurable
activities... even though these activities are likely to have painful consequences." Id. at 358.
97. According to the DSM-TR-IV, individuals suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
often engage in compulsive behaviors (such as repetitive hand-washing or counting) in order to
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serious mental illnesses may not believe their actions violate social
norms.98 In the alternative, these individuals may be so impulsive that
they engage in undesirable actions despite a high probability of
punishment. 99 In other words, Professor Slobogin suggests that some
individuals with mental disorders may be "undeterrable," either
generally through observing the punishments of other individuals, or
specifically by punishing these individuals to dissuade them from
engaging in similar conduct in the future. 100
In addition, the majority of people with mental disorders do not
receive mental health treatment while in prison.101 One study
evaluating recidivism among individuals with certain types of mental
disorders identified three elements necessary to prevent or reduce
recidivism: competent mental health care, access to mental health and
other social services, and legal leverage. 102 Although the study
discusses the access to and competency of care primarily in the context
of community mental health services, it notes that individuals must be
able to access care as they transition back into the community. 103 This
assertion necessarily assumes that individuals have access to
competent services while incarcerated. While the specific deterrent
effect of legal sanctions cannot be determined entirely by the
recidivism rate of individuals (as recidivism merely addresses the rate
of re-offense and not the rationale behind the behaviors that create
the offense), recidivism is nevertheless an instructive measure to
examine deterrence.
Overall, punishing individuals with mental disorders will not
achieve much of a deterrence goal. The individuals with severe mental
disorders are by nature "undeterrable," as it is difficult for them to
engage in the cost-benefit analysis upon which the deterrence theory
is based. Treating individuals with mental health disorders will
increase the likelihood that they can engage in the logical cost-benefit
analysis required for specific deterrence. However, the current
criminal justice system does not provide either competent care or
avoid undesirable but persistent thoughts or impulses (the obsessions). Id. at 457. In order to
avoid the anxiety these obsessive ideas cause, individuals yield to their compulsions or avoid the
anxiety-provoking situations, even though they are aware that the compulsive behaviors may be
excessive or inappropriate. Id. at 458.
98. SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 106.
99. Id.
100. Id. (coining the term "undeterrability").
101. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing the large number of individuals with
mental illness who do not receive any treatment while incarcerated).
102. J. Steven Lamberti, Understanding and Preventing Criminal Recidivism Among Adults
with Psychotic Disorders, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 773, 777-78 (2007).
103. Id. at 777.
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sufficient access to services, two key components in preventing
recidivism among individuals with mental disorders.
C. The Problem with Incapacitation
The purpose of incapacitation is to separate the individual from
society in order to protect society.10 4 This rationale is essentially the
same as the justification for involuntary confinement through civil
commitment. 0 5  Although civil commitment statutes vary by
jurisdiction, most statutes require a doctor to determine that an
individual poses a danger to herself or others, or is gravely disabled,
before she may be confined against her will. 10 6 For all practical
purposes, the only difference 10 7 between incarcerating an individual
with a mental disorder for incapacitation purposes and confining the
same individual under a civil commitment statute is the type of
mental health care available. Mental health care during incarceration
for a criminal conviction often is inadequate or nonexistent, 08 while
some type of treatment will be provided during the time an individual
is civilly committed.'0 9 As such, there is little justification for
employing criminal procedures and incarcerating individuals with
mental disorders solely to incapacitate them"0 when civil commitment
procedures are available to achieve the same purpose and may provide
more appropriate mental health care."'
104. Cotton, supra note 38, at 1316.
105. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 3-4
(2005).
106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:53(B)(1) (2008). The Louisiana civil commitment statute was
selected as an example here because the decision in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), is
integral to the civil commitment discussion. Foucha held that a state must first prove that an
individual suffers from a mental illness before she may be civilly committed. Id. at 86.
107. Aside from the implications of a new criminal conviction on an individual's record, that
is.
108. See supra note 101.
109. See Virginia Aldig6 Hiday & Heathcote Woolsey Wales, Civil Commitment and Arrests,
16 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 575, 577 (2003) (reporting that individuals who are
involuntarily hospitalized experience reduced symptoms and increased functioning not long after
admission and continuing through discharge).
110. Even though incarceration may not be necessary to achieve the goal of incapacitating
individuals with serious mental health disorders, civil commitment might not achieve the same
practical effects as incarceration, such as the creation of a criminal record, the initiation of
immigration proceedings, and the revocation of public housing eligibility. A legislature might
determine that these practical effects are desirable. However, using the incapacitation rationale
to justify incarceration may still be inappropriate to obtain these "desirable" side effects.
111. While civil commitment poses its own plethora of constitutional and statutory problems,
this Note will not attempt to tackle these issues. Instead, it makes the broad assumption that
civil commitment is a legal and viable means of incapacitation.
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The Supreme Court originally held that citizens either may be
involuntarily confined up to the length of their court-imposed criminal
sentences (but no longer) or, under a state's civil commitment
procedure, may be confined on the basis of two factors: dangerousness
and severe mental illness.112 In the 1992 decision of Foucha v.
Louisiana, the Court said that a Louisiana statute authorizing the
continued involuntary confinement of an insanity acquittee "if found
to be dangerous ... whether or not he is then mentally ill" was overly
broad and therefore unconstitutional. 113 Five years later, however, the
Court upheld the involuntary confinement of individuals who are
deemed to be dangerous, even in the absence of a serious mental
disorder, in Kansas v. Hendricks.114 The Court confirmed this
approach in 2002 in Kansas v. Crane when it found that the
respondent could be involuntarily confined for longer than his court-
imposed criminal sentence even though, like the inmate in Foucha, he
did not suffer from a severe mental disorder. 115 According to the
Court's holdings in Hendricks and Crane, dangerousness (based on a
lack-of-control determination) is now sufficient to warrant involuntary
confinement, even absent a serious mental illness.11 6 According to
Professor Slobogin, this jurisprudence suggests that the Court has
"abandon[ed] the traditional view that pure preventive detention is
reserved for those who are severely mentally ill."117
Professor Slobogin further argues that preventive confinement
is objectionable in these circumstances for four primary reasons." 8
First, purely preventive detention is unreliable, because the
government does not have the means to prove to a sufficient degree of
certainty that a particular person will re-offend. 119 Second, expanding
the preventive detention scheme in this way opens the door for
governments to avoid the civil commitment standards and effectively
impose punishment on individuals while also circumventing the
constitutional protections of the criminal system. 120 Third, it gives the
government too much power to detain individuals because it is not
112. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
113. Id. at 73, 86.
114. 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997).
115. 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).
116. SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 104-05 (discussing the Hendricks decision, which overruled
the Kansas Supreme Court's finding that Hendricks could not be involuntarily committed absent
a specific finding that he suffered from a severe mental disorder, was dangerous, and was unable
to make informed treatment decisions for himself).
117. Id. at 104.
118. Id. at 108.
119. Id. at 109.
120. Id. at 112-13.
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possible to define "dangerousness" clearly and narrowly, and the
government cannot interfere with individual liberty unless the public
is on notice that such sanctions are possible.121 Fourth, "even if all the
other objections are met, a regime that deprives people of liberty based
on what they will do rather than on what they have done shows
insufficient respect for the individual." 122 Because of these concerns,
and because incarcerated individuals are less likely to receive
adequate mental health treatment than individuals who are
involuntarily committed, using criminal sanctions as a method of
incapacitation is inappropriate. Purely preventative detention through
criminal sanctions, therefore, is unwise and unnecessary.
Although far from a perfect solution, civil commitment
standards provide the more appropriate method of identifying
individuals who suffer from mental health disorders that are so severe
that the individuals must be confined to protect themselves and
society. These statutes provide a procedure for involuntary
confinement that focuses on the individual rather than her crime and
results in incapacitation combined with mental health treatment. A
frequent criticism of using civil commitment as a means of
incapacitation is that an individual may be confined indefinitely, while
criminal sentences endure for a fixed length of time. However, the
decisions in Hendricks and Crane suggest that individuals may be
confined even longer than their court-imposed criminal sentences
based on the sole determination of "dangerousness."'123 Civil
commitment procedures are both a sufficient and constitutional means
of preventing an individual with a mental disorder from harming
herself or others, and at the same time, they are a means of providing
needed treatment to that individual during the confinement period.
Criminal sanctions, therefore, simply are not needed to achieve the
goal of incapacitation.
D. The Problem with Rehabilitation
Of the four animating purposes of the criminal justice system,
rehabilitation is the least problematic for people with mental
disorders. Rehabilitation is an attempt to change or improve the
inmate for her own benefit and in the hope that she will not
121. Id. at 115, 118.
122. Id. at 122.
123. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002) (supporting the idea that an individual
convicted of a crime may be confined even after the term of her sentence has expired); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997) (same).
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reoffend.' 24 In recent years, the legal community continually has
rejected rehabilitation as an appropriate criminal justice goal for most
individuals convicted of crimes. For example, when it was drafted, the
Model Penal Code suggested that rehabilitation should be a key
justification for criminal sanctions. 125 However, research conducted in
the 1970s seemed to demonstrate that rehabilitation never works, and
consequently, the rehabilitation purpose fell out of favor in the
modern criminal justice system. 126 A recent Model Penal Code
Sentencing Report argues that rehabilitation should not be accepted
unconditionally as the primary goal of punishment or as a major
component of any sentencing decision. 127 On the other hand, some
commentators have argued that if retribution fails to achieve its goals,
such outcome is due to resistance from judges and legislators who
prefer a retributive form of justice. 128 These commentators believe that
rehabilitative sanctions could "effect[] hoped-for reductions in the
future criminal behavior of inmates" if legislatures and courts allowed
them to work.
29
Even if rehabilitation is an unattainable goal for many
inmates, it could be considerably more attainable for inmates with
mental disorders. Mental health treatment would be essential to
improving the decisionmaking capacity of an inmate with a mental
disorder. Adequate mental health treatment might help an individual
to understand and manage her mental disorders better. For example,
the symptoms of schizophrenia, such as hallucinations and delusions,
can be managed through the use of antipsychotic medications and
accompanying self-care skills training. 130 Psychiatric medications such
as lithium, mood stabilizers, and antidepressants also can be effective
124. Cotton, supra note 38, at 1316-17.
125. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (listing "to promote
the correction and rehabilitation of offenders" as a purpose second only to preventing offenses).
126. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 28-29 (2003) (discussing the "Nothing
Works" message about rehabilitation of the 1970s but acknowledging the existence of a limited
number of rehabilitative programs that have "a demonstrated track record of success").
127. Id. at 29.
128. See Cotton, supra note 38, at 1357-58 (positing that utilitarian laws could have created
real change in the criminal justice system if the utilitarian purposes, including rehabilitation,
had been "taken seriously").
129. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 126, at 28 (describing the
interpretation of research in the 1970s as demonstrating the failures of rehabilitation).
130. See SARASON & SARASON, supra note 28, at 380-81 (noting that traditional
antipsychotic medications may be effective in moderating certain symptoms, but may also cause
undesirable side effects). Because traditional medications can cause undesirable side effects,
behavioral skills training can teach individuals certain social and self-care skills like grooming




means for treating bipolar disorder.131 Antidepressants are one
common treatment for individuals with severe depression. 132 These
medications help individuals to manage their mental health symptoms
and conform to societal norms.
Although medication may improve an individual's functioning,
other types of treatment are also needed. Over half of people with
schizophrenia will stop taking the recommended medication after they
are discharged from the hospital, 133 but behavioral skills training may
help individuals with necessary self-care skills and increase their
ability to monitor their own symptoms and medication needs.
134
Almost three-fourths of individuals with bipolar disorder will relapse
in the five years following their first episode, even if their
pharmacotherapy is excellent, but including psychoeducational
therapy with family members can improve symptoms. 135  A
combination of antidepressant medications and cognitive-behavioral
therapy is more effective than either medication or therapy alone for
treating severe depression. 13 6  Comprehensive mental health
treatment, tailored to address the needs of each individual, might
successfully rehabilitate inmates in the criminal justice system.
It would be a gross overgeneralization to assert that all
inmates with mental disorders would not have engaged in the
behavior for which they are being punished but for their mental health
problems. However, only a system based on rehabilitation can take
into account the unique situation of the inmate with a mental
disorder.137 A retributive scheme is flawed because it punishes
arguably less culpable individuals equally or more severely than it
punishes individuals who do not suffer from mental disorders.
131. See id. at 336 (mentioning a variety of psychotropic medications that may control the
symptoms of bipolar disorder). Although lithium is the most effective treatment for bipolar
disorder, the negative side effects cause many individuals to stop taking the medication. Id.
Other medications have fewer side effects, but are less effective in controlling symptoms. Id.
Antidepressants can bring on an undesirable rapid switch to a manic phase. Id. Additionally, the
relapse rate is very high even for individuals who are receiving excellent pharmacotherapy. Id.
at 337.
132. Id. at 337.
133. Id. at 380.
134. Id. at 382.
135. Id. at 383-84.
136. Id. at 331. 'The main focus of [cognitive-behavioral therapy] is to help clients think
more adaptively and, as a result, to experience positive changes in mood, motivation, and
behavior." Id. at 328.
137. That is, none of the other purposes of punishment in their current form. If a retributive
scheme properly considered an individual's mental illness in making the culpability calculation,
or a system based on deterrence tried to create deterrents that would be effective for individuals
with mental illness, those purposes have the potential also to be appropriate and effective.
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Likewise, irrational actors cannot be deterred, and the high recidivism
rate for people with mental disorders confirms that neither specific
nor general deterrence is achieved by punishing this population. While
incapacitation is arguably an appropriate reason to confine
individuals with mental health problems who may pose a danger to
the public, civil commitment statutes are better suited for that task
than the criminal law. Rehabilitation, therefore, is the best articulated
purpose to justify "punishing" individuals with mental disorders.
Currently, however, the criminal justice system does not provide the
rehabilitative programs these individuals need.
IV. APPLYING JUVENILE JUSTICE PRINCIPLES TO ADDRESS THE
THEORETICAL FAILINGS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The theoretical background of juvenile justice is an appealing
starting point for rehabilitating individuals with mental disorders. In
its most idealistic form, the juvenile justice system assesses the needs
of each particular individual and responds to her unique interests. 138
Although the current system looks more punitive than Judge Mack's
purely rehabilitative vision, those who administer the adult criminal
system nevertheless could learn much from the philosophies of
juvenile justice. Mental health courts would provide a rehabilitative
structure similar to that of the juvenile justice system to address the
unique needs of adults charged with crimes and suffering from mental
health problems.
A. Positive Contributions of the Juvenile Justice System
1. Diversion
The juvenile justice system attempts to divert youth away from
delinquency adjudications and traditional detention and into
rehabilitation programs such as counseling, drug and alcohol
treatment, or after-school programming. 139 Judge Mack's first vision of
the reformed system involved preventing children from ever engaging
in criminal activity, 140 which speaks directly to both the rehabilitative
nature of the juvenile justice system and to the use of diversion as one
138. Mack, supra note 46, at 119-20.
139. See FELD, supra note 48, at 345, 348 (describing diversion programs as gate-keeping
mechanisms to keep youths out of the juvenile system in a less stigmatizing and more flexible
manner).
140. Mack, supra note 46, at 122.
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major way to rehabilitate would-be "offenders." Each state structures
its diversion program differently, and diversion often can depend on
the subjective impressions of prosecutors or probation officers and be
influenced by factors such as race or family situation.14' However, the
possibility of diversion before a petition ever is filed is nevertheless
attractive, as it theoretically provides the possibility of avoiding the
stigma of a formal charge.14
2
Similarly, the ability to divert an individual suffering from
mental illness away from the criminal justice system could avoid the
stigma of a formal criminal charge, as well as provide more
rehabilitative opportunities tailored to meet the individual's needs.
Rehabilitation is the only appropriate criminal justice goal for
individuals with severe mental health disorders. 143 However, when
serious allegations arise, such as in the cases of Andrea Yates and
Eric Clark, it is unrealistic to assume that the public will accept pure
diversion (as it is conceptualized in the juvenile justice system) as an
appropriate sanction. In these cases, the juvenile justice principle of
"least restrictive means" also may be informative.
2. Least Restrictive Means
When it is problematic to divert a child away from the juvenile
justice system entirely, many juvenile courts use the principle of "least
restrictive means"-which is the principle of limiting sentences or
dispositions to the least invasive treatment that nevertheless will
achieve the rehabilitative goal of the court-to determine the
appropriate type of intervention. 144 Juvenile courts often must decide
between removing a child from her home and placing her in detention,
or some lesser degree of intervention. 145 Some courts interpret this
language as a strict requirement: the court must take the least drastic
step possible. 146 This analysis requires consideration of the severity of
the delinquency in comparison to the harshness of the intervention. 147
141. FELD, supra note 48, at 345, 349.
142. Id. at 348. In the juvenile justice system, a petition formally charges the child with the
violation of the law.
143. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., In re L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 403 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding the State did
not provide the child with the constitutionally and statutorily required least restrictive means);
State ex rel R.S. v. Trent, 289 S.E.2d 166, 170 (W.Va. 1982) (noting that a juvenile inmate is
"constitutionally entitled to the least restrictive treatment that is consistent with the purpose of
their custody").
145. FELD, supra note 48, at 348 (describing less severe forms of intervention).
146. In re L.KW., 372 N.W.2d at 398.
147. Id.
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Other courts hold that the least-restrictive-means analysis requires
the court to consider the least restrictive alternatives as factors in
determining the ultimate disposition, but the juvenile has no right to
the least restrictive means if they are not currently practical or
available.148
For individuals with mental illnesses within the criminal
justice system, the least-restrictive-means analysis could be useful for
determining whether a term of confinement or a lesser intervention is
appropriate. This determination might implicate the same concerns
seen in the dangerousness prong of civil commitment proceedings.
149
Although civil commitment in general and dangerousness
determinations in particular are not always viewed in a positive light,
a similar analysis could be useful for assessing individuals facing
criminal charges who are suffering from mental disorders. The
analysis to determine whether detention is appropriate for juveniles
employs several factors, such as their danger to society, background,
openness to rehabilitation, and cooperativeness. 150 Applying the
juvenile justice system's least-restrictive-means factors to adults with
mental illnesses enables a court to evaluate each adult on a case-by-
case basis. Overall, this type of analysis could be adapted from the
juvenile justice system and would prove helpful in determining the
type and severity of sanctions appropriate for individuals with mental
disorders.
3. Mental Health Courts: An Embodiment of
Juvenile Justice Principles
Mental health courts already are present in today's adult
criminal justice system. These courts divert individuals with mental
disorders away from the traditional criminal justice system and
provide more rehabilitative services. A mental health court is an
example of a "problem-solving court."1 51 Unlike traditional state
courts, problem-solving courts "seek to broaden the focus of legal
proceedings, from simply adjudicating past facts and legal issues to
changing the future behavior of litigants and ensuring the well-being
of communities."' 152 The focus on individuals and communities rather
148. In re B.B., 516 N.W.2d 874, 878-80 (Iowa 1994).
149. See supra Part III.C (discussing the relevance of dangerousness to confinement
decisions).
150. FELD, supra note 48, at 350.
151. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 28 LAW &




than crimes and legal issues is an embodiment of the rehabilitative
principles most commonly found in the juvenile justice system.
The first mental health court was established in Broward
County, Florida, in 1997 to deal with the large number of people with
mental disorders in the criminal justice system. 5 3 In 2000, Congress
passed a bill authorizing funding for the development of mental health
courts in jurisdictions across the country. 154 The bill authorized ten
million dollars per year from 2001 to 2004 to develop this special court
program and to provide additional training on mental illness for law
enforcement and judicial personnel. 155 The bill's proponents hoped
that the information gathered through the initial period of this pilot
program could be used to implement permanent strategies for
addressing the needs of offenders with mental illnesses. 156 As of
December 2005, a survey by the Criminal Justice and Mental Health
Consensus Project found 113 mental health courts in operation across
the United States.
157
Mental health courts vary by jurisdiction, but they generally
seek to divert individuals with mental disorders away from the
criminal system and to obtain mental health treatment for individuals
who are accused of crimes. 158 Usually the participants volunteer for
these programs, and social and mental health workers often are
available during proceedings. 15 9  Individuals receive treatment
"sentences," not jail time. 160 If they successfully complete treatment,
they may have their charges dismissed, or they might be transferred
back to criminal court to stand trial, but failing to complete treatment
could result in a jail sentence. 1
61
A successful criminal mental health court provides a more
rapid means of resolving an individual's problem, a more efficient use
of resources, and a specialized staff to focus on the individual and the
153. Richard A. Marini, Mental Health Courts Focus on Treatment; Criminals Often
Overlooked in Traditional System are Sentenced to Hospital Care, reprinted in JUDGING IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 59, 59 (David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick eds., 2003) [hereinafter JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY].
154. America's Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2201,
114 Stat. 2399, 2400 (2000).
155. 146 CONG. REC. H10,638 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2000) (statement of Rep. Scott).
156. Id.
157. NAT'L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 2 (2005),
http://mentalhealthcourtsurvey.com/pdfs/Mental_HealthCourts.pdf [hereinafter SURVEY].
158. Mental Health America, Position Statement 53: Mental Health Courts,
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/go/position-statements/53 (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
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crime. 162 In order to be successful, a mental health court should,
among other things, provide the following: 1) a therapeutic
environment and dedicated team; 2) an environment free from
stigmatizing labels; 3) opportunities for deferred sentences and
diversion away from the criminal system; 4) the least restrictive
alternatives; 5) decisionmaking that is interdependent; 6) coordinated
treatment; and 7) a review process that is meaningful. 163 The court
also should use positive reinforcement, such as rewards for meeting
deadlines, rather than sanctions to further its goals. 164
Critics argue that mental health courts are an inefficient use of
resources because it is more expensive to send individuals to
treatment than to jail. 165 An effective mental health court may be
cheaper in the long run, however, as studies have shown that
participating in a mental health court "improves a defendant's
chances of success in undergoing treatment, finding housing, and
developing other support systems," and participation also makes
individuals who participate "less likely to be re-arrested than those
who chose not to participate."'166 Lower re-arrest rates suggest that
even though the initial cost per individual is higher for treatment than
jail time, the total cost per individual might be significantly less if
treatment reduces the overall amount of contact between the
individual and the criminal justice system.
Mental health courts serve as an example of the way in which
an individual with mental health issues might be screened and
diverted away from the criminal justice system. Receiving mental
health treatment rather than jail time arguably would be more
rehabilitative in the long run. However, some differences exist
between mental health courts and the juvenile justice concept of
diversion. For example, in the adult criminal justice system,
individuals with mental health issues often must be charged formally
before they can be diverted into a mental health court or other
treatment program. In other words, either a grand jury must indict
the individual or a judge must determine that probable cause for the
allegation exists before an individual in the adult system may be
diverted. Comparatively, a child may be diverted away from the
juvenile justice system before a petition ever is filed against her. In
162. Randal B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of a Criminal Mental Health Court, reprinted in
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 153, at 118, 118.
163. Id. at 118-21.
164. Id. at 122.




order to realize fully the potential for rehabilitation modeled by the
juvenile justice system, all mental health courts should change their
structure so that individuals are not required to enter the criminal
justice system officially through an indictment, a finding of probable
cause, or a guilty plea in order to get mental health treatment.
Nearly all mental health courts exclude individuals charged
with violent felonies from participating, and some exclude individuals
charged with any type of felony. 167 Although the public outcry for
retributive sanctions may be louder for a more serious crime, the
rationale for diversion to a mental health court remains strong. It is in
this circumstance that the juvenile justice concept of least restrictive
means should be instructive. A mental health court can use this
juvenile justice principle to determine the appropriate outcome for
each individual it serves in order to determine the appropriate mix of
incapacitation through incarceration and rehabilitation through
mental health treatment for each individual suffering from severe
mental illness. Overall, revisiting the important concepts of diversion
and "least restrictive means" that influence the juvenile justice system
could improve the mental health courts that currently operate in some
criminal justice jurisdictions.
B. Challenges of the Juvenile Justice System as a Rehabilitative Model
Despite the insights that the juvenile justice system has to
offer, some of these ideas may, be unpalatable to the public.
Rehabilitation has not been widely accepted in the adult criminal
justice system. For example, the Model Penal Code received a great
deal of criticism when it attempted to establish rehabilitation as the
basis for the entire criminal system.168 It may be easier to "sell"
rehabilitation to the public as a theory of punishment when those
being rehabilitated are young. However, the controlled structure and
supervision provided by mental health courts could alleviate some of
these fears.
Another problem with mental health courts is the difficulty in
distinguishing the individuals who should be rehabilitated from the
individuals who should be punished. While age provides a clear line to
separate the juveniles who will receive rehabilitative sanctions from
the adults who will receive retributive sentences, no such bright-line
rule separates individuals with severe mental disorders from those
167. See generally SURVEY, supra note 157, at 1-67 (describing eligibility information for all
mental health courts in existence as of December 2005).
168. Cotton, supra note 38, at 1326.
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without mental disorders. DSM-IV-TR diagnoses, psychological
testing, and IQ testing could be possible methods for drawing a line in
the mental health context, but these measures encompass a great deal
of variability. Courts must determine which individuals qualify for
rehabilitation, but the increased subjectivity found in the mental
health context calls the applicability of the juvenile justice system into
question.
Additionally, the paternalism tolerated in juvenile courts based
on the state's parens patriae power may not be as acceptable in the
context of adults with mental illness. When inmates are still
considered children, it is easier to justify government intervention
because they are not allowed to make legally binding decisions and are
always under the control of others, such as parents and teachers.
However, exercising the same control over adults, even adults with
mental disorders, may be inappropriate. Such intervention, especially
with adults suffering from mental disorders that impact their
emotional and affective state rather than their cognitive abilities,
could be viewed as patronizing. Unlike children, adults with mental
disorders are not subject to the same parens patriae power that can
justify governmental intervention in the juvenile justice concept.
A final concern about the applicability of the juvenile justice
system is its lack of constitutional protection. Although Gault and its
progeny have extended some constitutional protections to juveniles in
certain circumstances, these protections are not absolute.169 Juveniles
have the right to counsel, for example, but they do not have a right to
a jury trial.170 As such, each juvenile justice principle should be
evaluated critically before it is applied to adults with mental disorders
because the constitutional protections of due process before
deprivation of liberty are absolute in the adult criminal justice system.
Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court occasionally has
considered adults with mental disorders to be similar to juveniles. The
Court's death penalty jurisprudence, for example, is substantially
similar when it examines the constitutionality of the death penalty for
individuals under the age of eighteen and for individuals who suffer
from mental retardation. On the same day in 1989, the Court decided
both Stanford v. Kentucky and Penry v. Lynaugh, which held,
respectively, that the death penalty was constitutional for juveniles
169. See FELD, supra note 48, at 673 ("Despite the increasing convergence of juvenile with
criminal courts, most states provide neither special procedures to protect juveniles from their
own immaturity nor the full panoply of adult procedural rights.").
170. Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1971) (holding that juveniles have the right to
counsel), with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that "trial by jury in
the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement").
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between the ages of sixteen and eighteen and individuals with mental
retardation. 171 Then, in 2002, the Court determined that the death
penalty was not constitutional for adults with mental retardation in
its decision in Atkins v. Virginia,172 and three years later it used much
the same reasoning to hold the death penalty unconstitutional for
juveniles under age eighteen in Roper v. Simmons.173 Although these
decisions focus solely on issues of mental retardation, the same
concerns regarding the individual's culpability and ability to make
rational choices also exist for individuals with mental disorders. Thus,
the death penalty jurisprudence of the Court suggests that the adult
criminal system is open to treating juveniles and individuals with
mental disorders similarly under the law.
Although applying juvenile justice principles to the adult
criminal justice system presents some challenges, the benefits greatly
outweigh the risks. Concepts like diversion and least restrictive means
will provide a theoretical framework for mental health courts as they
address the unique needs of individuals suffering from mental
illnesses in the criminal justice system. Mental health courts are
needed in every jurisdiction in the United States. Mental health
courts also should expand their scope to address the needs of
individuals charged with more serious offenses. Without this
expansion, a gap always will exist between the individuals charged
with less serious, non-violent crimes and the few individuals who are
found not guilty by reason of insanity.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. criminal justice system currently is failing to achieve
any of its express goals of punishment when inmates suffer from a
severe mental illness. Retribution is an inappropriate
conceptualization of punishment for these inmates because their
mental illnesses make them less culpable and therefore less deserving
of sanctions. In addition, sanctions will not deter individuals with
mental disorders from reoffending. Although punishment of inmates
with mental disorders can be justified by incapacitation, this goal is
better served through civil commitment proceedings. Finally, the
171. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that it was not cruel or unusual punishment to
execute a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old); 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that it was not cruel
or unusual punishment to execute a person who was mentally retarded).
172. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that a national consensus had emerged against
executing mentally retarded inmates).
173. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that it would be cruel and unusual punishment to
execute an inmate under the age of eighteen).
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current inadequate access to treatment is far from rehabilitative,
although rehabilitation is an appropriate purpose for sanctioning this
population.
The juvenile justice system provides a meaningful model for
improving the rehabilitative possibilities of the criminal justice
system. Juvenile justice's approach to rehabilitation emphasizes
diversion and encourages the use of the least restrictive means to
achieve an objective. These suggestions could be useful in reforming
the criminal justice system and in making the system as a whole more
rehabilitative. On the one hand, this perspective runs the risk of being
paternalistic, but on the other hand, it values decisionmaking focused
on the needs of one particular individual. In addition, mental health
courts are consistent with the tenets of juvenile justice and could be
expanded to provide more opportunities for treatment and
rehabilitation in the adult criminal justice system.
Overall, these recommendations would improve the way the
current criminal justice system treats individuals who, like Eric
Clark, may pass the high hurdle of the insanity defense. Regardless of
which theoretical approach the criminal justice system adopts with
respect to individuals with mental disorders, the system as it exists
now is untenable. Rehabilitation, the only purpose of punishment that
is appropriate for individuals with mental disorders, cannot be
achieved when the criminal justice system does not provide adequate
mental health care for incarcerated individuals. Retribution,
deterrence, and incapacitation, on the other hand, are inappropriate
punishment purposes for this class of individuals. The fact that the
current system is failing to meet any of its theoretical goals should
concern the legal community. Not only is this conflict of goals a legal
and intellectual conundrum, but the abundance of inappropriate
punishment schemes and the lack of appropriate treatment suggest a
moral and ethical dilemma as well.
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